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I. Introduction and the Basic Policy Goalsl
A. Trade In Services and the World Economy
The need for some type of international coordination and
cooperation concerning services trade across borders has become
apparent. While there exists an international legal framework
(albeit troubled and evolving) regarding trade in goods, 2 there is
very little such framework for services, except in certain specific
sectors. 3  Services make up a greater percentage of GNP of major
industrial countries than production of goods 4 and also comprise a
significant percentage of world trade. 5
Services comprise an extremely broad set of economic
activities, including banking, stock brokers, lawyers, engineering,
insurance, telecommunications, accounting, travel, tourism,
hotels, shipping, advertising, consulting, and construction. This
varied spectrum of activity is very difficult to define, 6 much
less regulate. Yet in many nations, these activities are growing
more rapidly than production of goods, and also in many nations
(not necessarily the same nations) governments are increasingly
tempted to step in and regulate these activities, 7 many times for
legitimate reasons of protecting consumers or other national
interests (such as national security), but also sometimes for pure
"protectionist" reasons to protect local entrepreneurs from the
rigors of competition of more efficient service providers located
or controlled primarily outside a nation's borders. The time seems
propitious for the development of an international regime to try to
inhibit the purely protectionist impulses of governments, before
these have led to national regulatory systems that will become
"hardened" and difficult to dismantle in the future.
These considerations were among those which led the
participants in the GATT Ministerial Meeting of September 1986, at
Punta del Este, Uruguay, to include in the Declaration launching
the eighth major GATT round of trade negotiations, provisions for
negotiating agreements on trade in services. These provisions were
certainly not without controversy, and the compromise language
adopted is not entirely clear on a number of significant matters.
But it is clear that the Uruguay round negotiators are charged with
the responsibility of addressing the problems of world trade in
services, as a counterpart to the existing world framework for
trade in products. 8
World welfare may be considerably enhanced by a system that
would forestall or dismantle some of the more purely protectionist
governmental regulation of service gctivity. However, it cannot
always be assumed that the familiar and traditional economic
doctrines relating to trade in goods, such as the doctrine of
comparative advantage (itself under some attack), apply in an
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equivalent manner to trade in services, although certainl some
respected economists seem to think that this is the case.
Because of the great variety of service activity, because often
this activity involves no tangible property, and because it is
sometimes difficult or impossible to identify when service activity
"crosses a border", the national or international regulation of
such activity is very difficult. For similar reasons, it is very
difficult to develop a new legal system for these activities. The
GATT model, for example is often cited as a possible approach for
services trade. 1 0  However, because of the great differences
between service trade and trade in goods, it is quite doubtful that
the GATT model can be followed too closely. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the possible legal/institutional structure
which could be utilized to develop an international discipline on
services trade, and to compare such structure to the GATT model.
At the outset the obvious must be recognized, that any
international discipline involves some "yielding of sovereignty" by
national governments. The GATT already imposes some constraints on
what sovereign governments are allowed to do. A "GATT for
Services" would likewise impose a number of constraints. At almost
every step of considering a structure for services, policy makers
must confront the trade off between, on the one hand, the needs of
broader goals of world and national economic welfare, and on the
other hand, the legitimate desires of national government leaders
to retain as many governmental tools as possible with which to
deliver appropriate solutions to the needs of their constituents.
In some cases these trade offs will result in a strengthening of
international discipline, yielding sovereignty. In other cases,
however, it will be impossible to do this, because the forces for
retaining power at national government levels will be too great.
In thinking about a structure for services, sensitivity must be
given to these trade offs. It is not always the case that
international control is better than the less centralized decisions
of governments which are closer to their constituents.1 1
In this paper, we will explore these basic institutional
questions about potential international agreements for trade in
services, in the context of "Uruguay" Round trade negotiations
mentioned above. This paper will not examine specific service
sectors or the detailed possible rules for specific service issues.
Those issues are much more ably addressed by other writers and
experts, who have specific knowledge of various service sectors. 1 2
The ideas and -reflections expressed in this paper stem partly
from considerable discussion about services trade with other
scholars, government officials and policy makers. No special claim
to originality for many of these ideas is made by this author ,
although some of his perspectives may dif fer f rom those of other
experts, and indeed some of these reflect some basic policy
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questions which appear as yet to be unresolved.1 3  The ideas in
this paper also stem from several decades of writing, thinking, and
practicing in the area of international trade and the GATT.
Obviously the history of GATT is rich in analogies and potentially
instructive experiences. However the GATT is a flawed
instrument, 1 4 for many reasons, and one of the objectives in a
services negotiation should be to avoid the mistakes and flaws of
the GATT.
Many points discussed below are put forward with
"tentativeness" and no claim of absolute truth. Many of these
points are "judgmental", and specific application will often depend
on constraints of negotiating context and pressures, as well as the
development of much additional information not currently available
to this writer, or, in some cases, to policy makers. However it is
hoped that this discussion below can serve as a sort of "checklist"
of issues and policy considerations which should at least be taken
into account during the Uruguay round of trade negotiations.
One particular policy direction implicit in the discussions
throughout this paper should be made explicit. There are strong
reasons why international institutions regarding economic relations
should be primarily targeted for a "rule oriented" rather than
"power oriented" approach. In previous writings this author has
explained this as follows: 1 5
"It seems to me that diplomatic techniques can be roughly
categorized into two groups: (1) the technique we can call "power
oriented"; and (2) the technique which we might call "rule
oriented." Power oriented techniques suggest a diplomat asserting,
subtle or otherwise, the power of the nation he represents. In
general, such a diplomat prefers negotiation as a method of
settling matters, because he can bring to bear the power of his
nation to win advantage in particular negotiations, whether the
power be manifested as promised aid, movement of an aircraft
carrier, trade concessions, exchange rate changes, or the like.
Needless to say, often large countries tend to favor this technique
more than do small countries; the latter being more inclined to
institutionalized or "rule oriented" structures of international
activity. . . .
"A rule oriented approach, by way of contrast, would suggest
that a rule be formulated which makes broad policy sense for the
benefit of the world and the parties concerned, and then there
should be an attempt to develop institutions to insure the highest
possible degree of adherence to that rule. . ..
"All diplomacy, and indeed all government, involves a mixture
of these techniques. To a large degree, the history of
civilization may be described as a gradual evolution from a power
oriented approach, in the state of nature, towards a rule oriented
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approach. However, never is the extreme in either case reached.
In modern western democracies, as we know them, power continues to
play a major role, particularly political power of voter
acceptance, but also to a lesser degree economic power such as
labor unions or large corporations. .
"(A] particularly strong argument exists for pursuing even-
handedly and with a fixed direction the progress of international
economic affairs towards a rule oriented approach. Apart from the
advantages which accrue generally to international affairs through
a rule oriented approach -- less reliance on raw power and the
temptation to exercise it or flex one's muscles which can get out
of hand; a fairer break for the smaller countries, or at least a
perception of greater fairness; the development of agreed
procedures to achieve the necessary compromises; in ECONOMIC
affairs there are additional reasons. .
"Economic affairs tend (at least in peace time) to affect more
citizens directly than may be the case for political and military
affairs. Particularly as the world becomes more economically
interdependent, more and more private citizens find their jobs,
their businesses, and their quality of life affected if not
controlled by forces from outside their country's boundaries. Thus
they are more affected by the economic policy pursued by their own
country on their behalf. In addition, the relationships become
increasingly complex4-- to the point of being incomprehensible to
even the brilliant human mind. As a result, citizens assert
themselves, at least within a democracy, and require their
representatives and government officials to respond to their needs
and their perceived complaints. The result of this is increasing
citizen participation, and more parliamentary or congressional
participation in the processes of international economic policy,
thus restricting the degree of power and discretion which the
Executive possesses. This makes international negotiations and
bargaining increasingly difficult.
"However, if citizens are going to make their demands be heard
and have their influence, a "power oriented" negotiating process
(often requiring secrecy, and executive discretion so as to be able
to formulate and implement the necessary compromises) becomes more
difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the only appropriate
way to turn seems to be toward a rule oriented system, whereby the
various layers of citizens, parliaments, executives and
international Organizations will al1 have their inputs, arriving
tortuously to a rule, which however, when established will enable
business and other decentralized decision makers to rely upon the
stability and predictability of governmental activity in relation
to the rule."
B. Trade In Goods: The GATT Structure Reviewed
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Since the GATT is often cited as a model for international
discipline in economic relations, it is worthwhile to briefly
review the nature and outlines of that institution. The most
important fact about GATT, or more broadly what we can term the
"GATT System" so as to embrace the many separate treaty instruments
and practices which together form the legal structure of GATT, is
that the GATT as such was never intended to be what it has become.
The original idea, in the period just after World War II, was to
create an organizational counterpart to the World Bank and the IMF
(International Monetary Fund), which would be called the ITO -
International Trade Organization. The GATT was to be merely an
agreement on tariffs, sort of appended to and serviced by the ITO.
In theory, the GATT was not an organization. By such theory, the
GATT does not have "members", but instead accepting governments are
"contracting parties", or "CP's."16
In due course, however, the ITO idea failed. The final draft
ITO charter completed at Havana, Cuba in 1948, was not accepted by
the U.S. Congress, and no other country was willing to bind itself
to that charter without its application to the then pre-eminent
economic power, the U.S. The GATT, however, was accepted by the
U.S. (through the "Protocol of Provisional Application") under
authority granted the U.S. President in the 1945 extension of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Thus, the Congress did not need
to approve the GATT.1 7
The GATT was thus thrust into the position of the principal
international institution for controlling trade, despite the fact
that agreement had inadequate institutional provisions (rule
making, voting, dispute settlement, new members, secretariat, etc.)
These constitutional infirmities are the source even today of some
of the significant problems of the GATT system. Some of these
problems have been extensively commented upon, and are part of the
agenda for the new GATT trade round of negotiation. 1 8
Substantively the core of GATT can be described as including
obligations which relate to trade in goods (but only trade in
goods), and which apply to constrain government regulatory actions.
Only a minute few of GATT obligations could be said to even
impliedly apply to business firms or individuals. 1 9  The GATT was
designed to limit what governments could do to place hurdles on
trade across borders. These obligations include:
1) Negotiated tariff "binding4, item by item, contained in a
schedule for each GATT contracting party, with the obligation on
such party to avoid applying a tariff in excess of the "bound rate"
contained in its schedule. 2 0U
2) MFNI - Most Favored Nation obligation, to require each GATT
CP to treat goods originating in any other GATT CP on an equal (or
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"at least as favorable") basis as that treatment afforded to the
most favored GATT CP. 2 1
3) National Treatment obligation to require each GATT CP to
treat imported goods, once they have crossed the border (cleared
the border "customs" process no less favorably than it treats
goods produced domestically.
4) A broad prohibition on the use of quotas (quantitative
restrictions), with a few exceptions (e.g. for Balance of Payments
reasons) .23
5) A series of "due process" type obligations constraining the
manner by which governments applied their tariffs and customs
regulations, requiring due notice, realistic (not arbitrary)
valuation methods, opportunity to appeal, etc. 2 4
6) Obligations permitting but channeling the use of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties (to offset dumping margins and
subsidies) 25
7) Obligations constraining the type of subsidies which can be
used to benefit goods which are exported or compete with imports. 2 6
The GATT agreement also contains a series of exceptions, some
of which arguably make serious inroads in the obligations mentioned
above. Most prominent among the exceptions are those for:
national security, governmental health and welfare and intellectual
property measures, customs unions and free trade areas, certain
agricultural programs, certain measures by developing countries to
aid economic development, and escape clause measures to slow
imports to allow domestic industries to better adjust to
competition. 2 7
In addition, because the GATT agreement as such has never come
into force, instead being applied through the Protocol of
Provisional Application, there exist "grandfather rights",
exempting some countries from parts of the GATT obligations when
these obligations conflict with "existing legislation."28 Also,
for certain historical reasons, the GATT provides an "opt out"
clause (in Article 35), allowing any country to "opt out" of a GATT
relationship with any other GATT country, exercisable ( in theory)
at one ti.me only, namely the time when one or the other country
enters GATT.2 9 These two exceptions in particular have caused a
number of troublesome problems in the GATT and its ability to
effectively discipline international economic relations. When
added to the longer list of other exceptions, the pattern of
"escapes" provides sufficient opportunity for governments to evade
their GATT responsibilities as to evoke the criticism that GATT is
meaningless ( which it is not) .
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Furthermore, partly because of the weakness of the GATT
institutional provisions, particularly the dispute settlement
procedures and the procedures for keeping rules up to date with
rapidly changing international patterns of economic activities
(such as evolving ideas of "industrial policy"), even those rules
of GATT which technically apply are sometimes avoided.3 0
Despite all this, the GATT has been remarkably successful in
holding its own as an effective international system to keep
pressure on governments to avoid at least the most damaging of
protectionist measures. Certainly it has been far more successful
than could have been predicted in the early period after the
failure of the ITO. A key question, however, is how much longer
can the GATT system cope with a world which is economically very
different from that for which it was designed. The GATT
membership, for example, has increased more than fourfold and now
includes a much greater variety of economic systems and stages of
development. 3 1  The GATT was essentially designed for market
economies, and has great difficulty coping successfully with state
trading, non-market economies, and even some activities of modern
market economy governments such as industrial policies based on
targeting strategies. Even modest differences in economic
structure, such as customary differences in debt-equity structures
of firms, can have significant impacts on trade flows and
entrepreneurial behavior, some of which is perceived as "unfair" in
the eyes of domestic industries competing with goods from some
other systems. 3 2
C. Policy Goals for a Services Agreement
The complexity, defects, and problems of the GATT system for
trade in goods, when added to the much greater variety and
complexity of services trade, results in a mosaic or web of
crosscurrents which is so potentially difficult to organize by
international rules, that any person, no matter how expert, must
approach the subject with a great deal of caution. Indeed, in this
writer's view, it will not be possible to build, within a few years
or the time span of one GATT negotiating round, a complete
structure of such rules. Instead, to this writer it seems better
to recognize this, and to focus on the institution and structure
which could be put in place. Such a structure should allow the
satisfactory evolution of substantive rules over a period of some
decades, so that these would enhance the broader goals of
increasing world welfare while retaining for sovereign governments
enough power and decision making authority to enable those
governments to continue to administer to their constituent's
reasonable needs.
For example, it appears dangerous and probably impractical, to
try to design sweeping rules, such as a broad national treatment
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obligation, which apply to all "services", regardless of sector.
The details of how best to design an international discipline for
the banking sector, for example, may differ substantially from that
endeavor for the insurance, or engineering services sectors. 3 3
Different sectors have different rates of technological advance,
different degrees of importance to "national security" or other
sovereign goals, and rely on substantially different business
structures (compare banks with airlines!). In addition, the level
of national government regulation already in place (and thus the
interest group support for the status quo) varies greatly from
sector to sector, as well as from country to country.
What is very important, however, is to think carefully about
the basic "constitutional" or institutional structure of a system
which can constructively contribute to the beneficial evolution of
sets of more detailed rules over a period of time. Such a
structure should be relatively non-threatening so as to encourage
as broad participation as possible. It should provide the
framework for gathering information and developing detailed
analyses and studies to facilitate future rule development. It
should put in place a legal structure to reinforce the evolution
and predictability of rules relating to service trade in a variety
of sectors. And, although encouraging broad participation, so that
"hold-outs" don't jeopardize the willingness of participants to
enter into meaningful commitments, it should allow sub-groupings of
like-minded nations to forge ahead with sets of obligations which
not all "members" are yet prepared to accept. In other words it
should to the extent feasible avoid the MFN foot dragger problem
experienced in GATT and in other contexts. 3 4
This is an ambitious agenda. Clearly some goals mentioned will
not be fully or satisfactorily achieved, at least in the short run.
A priority focus on those long term "constitutional" issues does
not always provide encouragement to firms or groups interested in
short term "bottom line" oriented results. There is therefore
always some risk of losing support for the services negotiation
endeavors from some constituent groups. Thus some compromises
between the longer-term goals, and more short term results are
probably inevitable. What must be preserved, however, is the goal
of achieving, hopefully by the end of the Uruguay Round, a legal-
institutional structure which, while providing some useful rules
for specific service sector trading activity, will have in place a
"constitution" for the many further decades of rule and discipline
developments for service trade.
In carrying out these policy objectives, past experience,
especially that of GATT, will be extremely useful. Thus in the
discussion below, frequent reference has been made to that
experience. In particular, it would seem desirable to avoid some
of the institutional def ects , as well as the problems posed by
"grandfather" type exceptions which have troubled the GATT.
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Likewise, there seem many good arguments to try to achieve as broad
and varied a membership in the overall system as possible, and to
avoid the characterization of "rich-man' s club" for the institution
for services by drawing developing countries as deeply into the
process as possible.
II. Structure of a Constitution for Services Trade
A. Relation to GATT
Services trade should not and cannot realistically be
"incorporated" into the GATT agreement. For example, the notion
that the GATT would be amended briefly, so that the GATT agreement
as we know it now would apply not only to products, but also to
services, would not be wise for a number of reasons.
First, amending the GATT is very difficult, requiring two-
thirds (and for some purposes unanimous) consent of existing
contracting parties (currently exceeding 94 in number). Thus,
countries which oppose an international services discipline would
be in a position to exact concessions and compromises which could
considerably water down the endeavor. This reasoning is why, in
the Tokyo Round, nations opted to rely primarily on side "codes" or
separate agreements rather than amending the GATT.
35
Second, the GATT has inadequate institutional provisions.
These would simply carry over to services issues some of the most
serious problems of the GATT already felt for product trade.
(Some of these problems have been mentioned above.) This would be
particularly true on core questions such as dispute settlement
procedures, voting, new members and their status, methods of
developing new rules and keeping them up-to-date.
3 6
Third, it would be very threatening and probably
politically unacceptable to apply many of the GATT obligations in
an indefinite and ambiguous way to all service sectors, known and
unknown. Nations would find a compelling political need to examine
in detail how particular GATT obligations, such as national
treatment, or rules on subsidies, would apply to each sector of
service activity ( banking, insurance , engineering , lawyers ,
doctors, economists, education, films, TV programs, theatre,
consulting f or government agencies , .advertising, investment and
securities, etc.) In many of these sectors, information and data
are not readily available. No nation is likely to be willing to
accept broad "blank check" type obligations applying even to future
unknown activities as well as current little understood activities.
In addition, it is- not entirely clear that world welf are would be
enhanced by typical GATT rules of liberal trade in all service
Page 11
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sectors. Intellectual property issues, for example may require
restricting trade in order to enhance longer run world welfare.
3 7
Fourth, there is advantage in experimenting with rules for a
few selected service sectors before extending similar rules to
other, less well known sectors.
The most difficult and "threatening" GATT obligation is, of
course, that of national treatment. This obligation requires
nations to treat imports in a non-discriminatory manner relative to
domestic products. When applied to services, it would require
nations to apply their regulations in a manner that was not less
favorable to service providers from other nations, compared to
those from within the nation itself. It is easy to understand why
many nations would be hesitant to agree to a strong national
treatment obligation in many service sectors, at least without some
evolutionary experience as to how these may affect its tools for
governing, (countries with nationalized banks), for example, would
find a number of problems with an obligation requiring treatment of
foreign banks no Less favorably than its treatment of domestic
banks. In a number of other sectors, secrecy issues will come into
play to reinforce some national fears of international rules.
3 8
In addition, for some service activities effective access to a
foreign market requires a "right of establishment" which raises
issues of long-standing controversy.39
Likewise the GATT subsidy rules could be very troublesome.
Subsidies are a central tool of governments, albeit often misused.
Subsidy issues perplex the policy makers and negotiators in
connection with trade in products. 4 0  Such perplexity would be
compounded in relation to service sectors, many of which are less
well understood, and would involve intangibles which are more
difficult to administer or to evaluate. 4 1
In addition, for some types of services, traditional rules for
products do not fit. In some cases services can be easily provided
by establishments located outside the consuming nation. For other
services, some sort of "establishment" within the consuming nation
is necessary for effective delivery of services, and this raises a
host of traditional and non-traditional international law questions
such as right of establishment, protection of foreign investment,
employment rules, etc. 42 Many of the developing country worries
of recent decades about the activities of multinational
corporations will manifest themselves in opposition to rules such
as national treatment, regarding services. Even developed nations
worry about the relative ease by which multi-national corporations
seem to be able to evade government regulation. 43
B. The Overall Structure of a Constitution for Services Trade
The various considerations mentioned have led a number of
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persons to suggest an approach to a services constitution which
would involve at least two "layers" of agreement. The objective
would be to provide a legal and institutional structure for
international trade in services, which would make it very easy and
"non-threatening" for countries to participate at least in the
"first" or "top" layer of obligations. This top layer would
contain the overall institutional measures (including the
supervisory body, secretariat, decision making rules, and dispute
settlement procedures) along with some relatively modest
obligations (as outlined below). Some substantive provisions in
this layer might be phrased as "principles", "objectives" or
"goals." The basic purpose of this "layer" would be to put in
place a legal-institutional structure which would facilitate the
longer term evolution of specific sector agreements with detailed
rules regarding those sectors.
Many have termed this top "layer the "umbrella agreement". It
would be complemented by a series of specific "service sector
agreements" (SSA's) or "codes", such as a code for banking, one
for insurance, etc. However, the Umbrella agreement might also
contain a sort of "intermediate" layer, of more significant
concrete obligations regarding a specified list of service sectors.
This intermediate layer could'be constructed as an "optional
title", or "optional protocol" (similar to the legal structure of a
number of international agreements, especially in the human rights
area). This optional title, which we can call the "general
services protocol" or GS Protocol, could also be legally designed
as simply another "SSA", but one which applied to a number of
different service sectors in the absence of a specific service
sector agreement. This "GS Protocol", could contain a few key
obligations such as a MFN (most favored nation) obligation and some
form of national treatment, but could be fashioned to apply only to
a specified list of service sectors (to avoid the "bank check"
problem). It could also be worded so that whenever a more detailed
service sector agreement (SSA) were ultimately adopted for a
specific sector, this SSA would prevail over the GS Protocol.
The final layer of obligations would be contained in a series
of specific service sector agreements (SSA's) or codes. Each
sector agreement would be devoted to one service sector, and could
then be tailored to the particular needs and complexities of that
sector. It would be understood that not all members of the
umbrella agreement would need to join any particular sector
agreement, but normally there would be some advantages of sector
agreement membership which would not accrue automatically to
countries which did not accept the sector agreement.
At the outset, it may only be feasible to negotiate four or
five sector agreements. Time and negotiating resources, as well as
political acceptability, will constrain the number of sectors which
can be covered. The umbrella code could include a framework for
Page 13
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negotiating sector "codes" as well as rules as to how the sector
agreements relate to the umbrella agreement. However, so that an
umbrella agreement would not be too "hollow", some countries, e.g
the industrialized OECD group, could decide among themselves, as a
negotiating strategy, that the umbrella agreement would not come
into force unless at least two specified number of sector
agreements came into force, which in turn could depend on a minimum
number of acceptances of the sector agreements.
In the next several parts of this paper we will explore further
the possible details of these various "layers" of agreement.
C. United States Law and Other National Laws Related to the
"Constitution"
While considering the international structure for an
institution and obligations about trade in services, some thought
should also be given to the law of the United States (and certain
other key countries, such as the EEC), which would be appropriate
in relation to a new international institutional/legal structure
for such trade. The U.S. law in relation to GATT has always been
troubled, leading to occasional (incorrect) statements that the
GATT is not a binding legal instrument or that the GATT has never
been correctly approved under United States Constitutional law. 4 4
This can be contrasted with the situation for the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, for which the U.S. statute called
the "Bretton-Woods Agreements Act" exists. 4 5
In the 1945 Bretton-Woods Agreements Act, the Congress
authorized U.S. participation in the IMF and World Bank, and laid
down rules governing how the U.S. would organize its representation
in those organizations, and specifying that for some subjects (such
as amendment or changing the par value of the dollar) the
permission of Congress would be required. Even if approval of a
set of services agreements were to occur in the U.S. through "fast
track" type legislative procedures 4 6 it is likely that the
Congress would want some constraints on the Executive and its
relation to the new institution, analogous to those in the Bretton-
Woods Agreement Act. Thus some thought should be given to the
appropriate framing of such constraints. For example, it might be
appropriate to spell out the method by which Congress would approve
future sector agreements negotiated under the umbrella agreement,
and the Congress might be willing to apply a fast track procedure
for such approvals.
III. Possible Contents of An Umbrella Agreement on Services Trade
For an umbrella or first "layer" agreement for services
trade, the principal objective should be the broadest possible
participation, consistent with a viable institutional structure
which would promote a beneficial long-run evolution of rules for
services trade. The subjects listed below should be among those
Page 14
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considered for inclusion in this "first layer." In Part IV of this
paper, we will turn briefly to a possible "general service
protocol" or second layer of obligations which might well be
included in the overall umbrella agreement, but for which
acceptance would be optional. Such second layer, however, should
be constructed so as to have some benefits for those who do accept.
One possibility is. to reserve "MFN" treatment to apply only for the
optional protocol adherents. A number of the other obligations
mentioned below, could well fall back into the "optional protocol",
if in the negotiation it turned out that inclusion in the overall
universal "umbrella" would cause too many nations to refrain from
joining.
A. Statement of Objectives
Carefully phrased objectives in an agreement can have a
considerable effect in later interpretation and implementation of
the agreement, and in resolving disputes about the agreement. 4 7
GATT Agreement objectives are worded as follows. (These
can be modified for services.)
"Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour. should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
the production and exchange of goods.
"Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce, . .
In addition, a general objective of minimizing world
tensions stemming from economic relations might be added.
Other stated objectives might relate to:
Need to recognize the advantages of rules, predictability. Need for
further study and gathering of information Need to develop a
framework for pragmatic evolution of rules regarding a wide variety
of service sectors. Need to assist economic development in those
countries with lower standards of leiving. Need to balance the
advantages of national sovereignty with the advantages of
international cooperation and disciplines.
B. Institutional Measures: Supervisory Body, Voting, Rule
making, Secretariat, Dispute Settlement, Membership
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1. Supervisory Body: Provisions to set up a general
highest authority supervisory body, called "Assembly", or
"Contracting Parties", or similar. These provisions should address
the typical international organization questions such as seat of
headquarters, frequency of meetings, powers and competence, and
especially voting. 4 8 Clearly consideration about these provisions
must include their relationship with the existing GATT. Presumably
it would not be advisable to simply allow the existing GATT
Contracting Parties to be the supervising body for the new services
area. But the relationship between the GATT and a new services
supervising group would need to be worked out. Does this imply an
even broader over-all group for both endeavors such as a modified
and institutional structure along the lines of the ill-fated OTC
(Organization for Trade Cooperation) of the mid-1950's? Or can the
GATT and a new set of contracting parties for services share
premises, staff, secretariat, and other
institutions?
The voting question will be particularly sensitive. 4 9
In order for decisions to be effective, they must be accepted by a
reasonably large part of the real power which exists among members.
A one-nation one-vote procedure for at least certain decisions is
not conducive to such effectiveness, since the powerful nations can
sometimes be outvoted, and will then refuse to effectively carry
out the decisions. On the other hand the system does not need to
cater exclusively to power, but should impose a sense of fairness
and a perception of justice on even the powerful nations. Various
combinations of voting structure should be examined for possible
use in a services umbrella agreement. Obviously the weighted
voting structure of the IMF or World Bank, is a model which must be
considered. Perhaps voting can be weighted by percentage of the
total international service trade of participant countries.
Combinations of weighted and one-nation one-vote systems can be
used, to protect the less powerful from the more powerful. A
"Council" or other sub-body, with selected representative
membership, can sometimes substitute for weighted voting. For
example, in a 100 nation organization, a 20 nation "council", with
membership guaranteed to the five largest trading nations and to
representatives of each of several geographic regions and types of
economic systems, can be joined with a two-thirds or three-fourths
council voting requirement as a condition of adoption of certain
types of decisions .
The voting question relates intimately to the types of
decisions to be made. Perhaps a "qualified" voting pattern could
be required for new rules, for budgets, and for certain waivers.
Voting on certain questions should probably only be
allowed to sub-sets of the umbrella membership. For example,
powerful arguments (and precedent practice) can be demonstrated to
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support a rule that, regarding issues of legal treaty
interpretation or application of a subordinate specific sector
agreement (not the umbrella agreement), only thos nations which
have accepted the specific agreement should vote.A 0  Yet there
could be much value in allowing all umbrella nations to participate
in the debate on the subject, (so that non-sector parties have
their "day in court" concerning by-product effects of specific
sector rules and actions).- Thus it might be efficient and
beneficial to allow the umbrella supervisory body to play a
supervisory role for the specific sector agreements, (rather than a
separate "committee of signatories" for each, as practiced in the
GATT context), provided that the voting on a measure be limited to
nations which have accepted the specific sector agreement.
2. Smaller Steering and Policy Body: Since the overall
supervisory body is not likely to meet too frequently, a smaller
body such as a "council", (as the GATT practice has developed, or
comparable to the Executive Board of the IMF) will be necessary.
Again voting and power distribution need to be considered.
3. Secretariat: Provision must be made for a secretariat,
and for the position of the chief officer of the secretariat.
Funding and budget obligations and decisions must be determined.
One of the important questions in this regard will be whether to
use the GATT secretariat, or more appropriately, whether to use a
combined secretariat which will service both the GATT and the
services agreement. Obviously many arguments exist to favor that
approach.
4. Membership: The process for accepting new members
(two-thirds vote? or open enrollment?), expulsion of members (gross
defiance of obligations, as ruled by a dispute settlement panel and
approved by two thirds of the supervisory body?), must be set
forth.
5. Final clauses: Provisions must be made for the
traditional final clauses for a treaty, when it is to open for
signature, ratification, come into force (when 20 countries,
comprising at least 25% of the international services trade total
of all preparatory countries?), etc.
C. Dispute Settlement
It would be most wise to provide a carefully thought out
set of procedures and institutions f or dispute resolution of all
issues concerning services trade, including issues arising under
specific sector agreements or other related or subordinate
treaties. The GATT approach of multiple procedures is not
benef icial 5 1 since it allows "focrum shopping" , adds to the
uncertainty of procedures, imposes greater needs of expertise and
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staffing, is harder for the world's public to understand, and tends
to be more easily abused and manipulated. A single overall
procedure allows the best chance for the prestige of a dispute
settlement process to develop, which is the real basis in
international relations of the potential effectiveness of such a
procedure.
Such a procedure should involve an impartial "panel" as the
central feature, which panel would be charged with making
impartial, third-party, well reasoned (and published) "findings" or
"determinations", focused on whether certain actions by a nation
are inconsistent with treaty obligations. The procedure should
provide for secretariat services, and a roster of potential
"panelists", and should embrace the following obligations and steps
in the procedure:
1) A general obligation to consult with any other nation
or nations who are members of the Services Umbrella agreement, on
any matter related to trade in services, (regardless of whether the
matter is covered by a sector agreement or any other service rules
under the system). The obligation should spell out the duty to
provide reasonable information about actions or processes
concerning service trade in any member nation. This step can be
confidential, and bilateral.
2) An obligation to cooperate in a process of mediation or
conciliation supervised by a secretariat service, if the
consultation step above does not result in a settlement of
differences. The secretariat will assist the parties in achieving
some sort of resolution of their differences, (a process which in
GATT is often unfortunately confused with other parts of the
dispute settlement procedure.)
3) A panel procedure is needed, invocable as of right by
any member of the services umbrella agreement, which will focus on
developing "findings" about the consistency of practices with legal
treaty obligations, (including those in specific sector
agreements.) (The unfortunately ambiguous language of GATT dispute
settlement procedures, the "nullification or impairment" phrase,
should be avoided.) The first two steps above should be a
prerequisite for this step. Measures for selecting panel members
must guard against delaying tactics , and ensure impartiality of the
panel as well as its expertise. More detail than exists in GATT is
needed for procedures for fact and, information gathering, for
representation of interested parties other than the original
disputants, for time limits, and for avoiding delay in publication
of the panel's report. The panel need not be given power to
"recommend", and should avoid conciliation efforts which sometimes
confuse panelists as to their role of coming to an objective
finding. Provision could be made for disputants to opt in favor
of: a) being bound by the panel report, and b) giving the panel
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power to make recommendations or rule "ex aequo et bono" (on
equitable rather than legal grounds), as is the case now for the
world court. Absent such agreement, however, the panel's
competence should exclude these results or activities.
4) A political body of the organization, such as a council
or the overall supervisory body, or similar sector body, should
have the power to approve, disapprove, send back a report for
redoing, or invoking a new panel process to redo a case. This
provides a sort of "political" or "policy" filter for the otherwise
more strictly legal results of a panel process. The panelists can
then focus on the legal questions, and be impartial. The political
filter can invoke broader policy considerations, but only after the
world knows the results of able thinking about the legal issues, so
that those results become part of the broader considerations. This
political filter process can make it more palatable for nations to
commit themselves to a meaningful dispute settlement process, and
yet as time and experience operates to (hopefully) increase the
prestige of the panel process, it is more likely that a panel
report will have great weight in the political considerations.
5) The final step in a process is consideration of a
potential "sanction" or responding actions by either a complaining
country, or in cases severe enough, all nation members of the
organization. However, it must not be assumed that sanctions or
retaliation type responses are essential for a dispute settlement
process to be successful. In fact, the prime reason for
effectiveness of such a process is the willingness of nations,
especially powerful nations, to "voluntarily" implement the results
of a panel report. This is more likely if a panel process gains
prestige and respect through experience and carefully crafted
impartial and reasoned reports. Sanctions are often not that
important. Nations realize that to ignore or flout a dispute
settlement result will, reciprocally, make it harder for them to
utilize that procedure when they need it, and will generally reduce
the utility of the treaty commitments made in the general legal
system designed for services.
D. Transparency Obligations:
A very important obligation which can be a prime candidate
for the umbrella agreement, is an obligation to report many kinds
of information about governmental practices relating to services
trade. This will assist nations and the secretariat to study the
problems of services trade, perhaps'preparatory to the development
of new sector agreements, or up-dating existing agreements. The
consultation obligation mentioned above is related to this, but in
that context information can remain confidential. A general
obligation which would give the supervisory body the authority to
require (as a legal treaty obligation) information on any matter
relating to services trade (probably with national security,
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intellectual property and proprietary business exceptions) within
reasonable resources available, would be extremely useful as part
of the umbrella agreement. The supervisory body could be empowered
to establish a "transparency committee" or other sub-body which
could act on its behalf, and generally supervise the gathering and
examination of data. It could also rule on disputes about what is
required from members nations by the transparency obligations.
E. Regulatory Due Process
Closely related to transparency, but going beyond it, is
the concept of "regulatory due process." GATT Articles VII through
IX contain some analogous measures for customs procedures. 5 2  It
would be very useful to have general obligations in the umbrella
agreement, applicable to all services trade, which would require
all members to afford a certain fair standard of procedures in
government dealing with foreign service providers. This could
include measures requiring fair notice, available information about
regulations and procedures, right of appeal to an impartial
tribunal, and similar matters. These could be linked to the
consultation and dispute settlement procedures of the umbrella
agreement. At least national governments could raise matters on
behalf of their service providers who feel aggrieved by the actions
of another nation.
F. Relation to Sector Specific Agreements
The umbrella agreement should include provisions which
contemplate specific service sector agreements, and spell out the
relationship of those agreements to the umbrella agreement.
Several dimensions of this topic exist:
1) Some provision should be made in the procedures by
which specific sector agreements are to be negotiated. For
example, it could be made explicit that if sector negotiations
fulfill specified criteria, then the umbrella secretariat would
provide services to assist the negotiation and implementation. (A
list of possible subjects to be considered for any sector agreement
is discussed in Part IV below. The umbrella agreement might
contain a similar list, perhaps as an Annex, as sort of a checklist
for negotiators.)
2) Certain criteria should be established in the umbrella
agreement as prerequisites for a service sector agreement to be an
"agreement under the services umbrella". These should include:
a) Participation in negotiating the sector agreement
should be open to all nation members of the umbrella. Provision
must be made for all members to at least have an opportunity to be
heard in any negotiation, so as to point out potential problems in
a possible agreement which would affect their interests, even if a
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country knew it would not accept the obligations of the new
agreement when the draft is completed.
b) The subject matter must be "services trade"
c) The supervisory body or its sub-body such as a
council must approve (or at least not disapprove) the negotiation,
probably by some sort of specially qualified vote, which must give
leeway to desires of a relatively small group of like minded
nations to launch such a negotiation. (Otherwise nations will take
their affairs elsewhere, outside the services umbrella.)
d) The umbrella dispute settlement procedures must
apply to the sector agreement rules and members.
e) Sector agreement rules (even though later in time)
are subordinate to umbrella agreement rules, unless the umbrella
agreement provision expressly allows sector agreements to
deviate. 5 3
f) The Sector agreement must be open to membership for
any nation member of the umbrella agreement, with the only
condition that the nation must accept the rules and discipline of
the sector agreement in order to be a part of it.
3) As an agreement under the umbrella, the sector
agreement would benefit from various advantages:
a) Secretariat services of the umbrella
b) dispute settlement procedure of the umbrella
c) Possible deviation from certain specified umbrella
obligations which are made subject to approved SSA's.
d) transparency provided in the umbrella agreement
e) An opportunity to deviate from a general umbrella
agreement MFN requirement, (as explained below in G.)
f) the umbrella agreement, absent contrary provisions
in the sector agreement, could furnish some of the technical "final
clauses" and institutional measures, such as provision for new
members, amending, ratification, funding secretariat services and
other measures, rules on observers and state succession, etc.
G. MFN Non-Discrimination Provisions
A key question is to what extent an umbrella agreement
should set forth an MEN (Most-Favored-Nation) obligation. There
are a number of aspects which need consideration. There are some
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persuasive arguments that suggest it may not be in the best
interests of some major industrial countries to enter into MFN
obligations, especially if those countries are already
significantly more receptive to foreign business than most other
umbrella agreement countries would be. A possibly attractive
alternative, therefore, would be to omit the MFN obligation from
the basic mandatory umbrella agreement, but include it as part
of the "optional protocol", on a basis by which only those nations
acdepting the protocol would be entitled to receive "services MFN."
One problem is that there already exist a number of treaties (e.g.
FCN, or Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties), which
contain MFN obligations which apply in various forms to services
trade or aspects (such as right of establishment) of services
trade. Clarification of these legal interrelationships would be
needed. In addition to those considerations, however, some other
important questions would need to be addressed in the context of
the MEN clause, where ever it is placed: First, it might be
desirable to include a general MFN obligation in the umbrella
agreement, applicable to all possible services trade questions, and
binding all members of the umbrella agreement. This obligation is
not a national treatment obligation, that is, it does not require
nations to treat "imports" or foreign service trade as well as it
treats its domestic service producers. (National treatment is
discussed below). Instead, MFN requires each nation to treat the
service trade of any other nation member of the umbrella agreement,
at least as favorably as it treats the service trade of any nation
(other than itself).
The MFN commitment has many merits - reducing distortions
in trade and thus maximizing welfare, reducing rancor and tension
among nations, sometimes accelerating liberalization by
generalizing to all member nations any particular liberalizing
activities.9 4  However, MFN also creates the "footdragger" or
"free-rider" problems. Attempts by smaller groups of nations to
develop more advanced beneficial rules can be thwarted if these
nations know they must offer all benefits of better rules to all
member nations, regardless of whether the beneficiaries will
reciprocate or will undertake the discipline of the rules.
Attempts to get every nation "signed up" make the process
vulnerable to one or two hold-out nations. While going ahead
without the holdout gives, under MEN, a free ride to the hold outs.
Thus it seems clear that any general MEN requirement,
whether located in the optional prptocol, or in the main umbrella
agreement, should make an exception for specific sector agreements.
Nations who accept the discipline of a sector agreement, should
also receive the benefits. Nations who refuse the discipline can
be denied the benefits. This is a form of "code conditional MEN",
similar to some (controverted) views of the approach of several of
the Tokyo Round GATT Codes . 5 5 The controversy of the GATT on this
should be avoided, and the umbrella agreement should make it clear
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that "code conditionality" is a standard exception to the general
umbrella or optional MFN requirement. Of course, specific sector
agreements can (and should) have a specific type of MFN requirement
for national government activities in the sector concerned.
It may be that other exceptions of a general MFN clause
would be wise also. At least this can be considered. There will
also probably be a political need for some "grandfather" type
exceptions, at least during a transition period. It would be wise
to explicitly provide for these, but to provide a strict time limit
(with a sensible decision making process for renewal). There
should also be a reporting or "registration" requirement for every
exception (to reduce controversy over the existence and extent of
the exception). In addition, there should be a general prohibition
against treaty reservations. These prov=.sions and limits on
exceptions may apply more broadly than ; st to the MFN context.
They also relate to a general "waiver" authority, described below.
H. National Treatment and Right of Market Access Obligations
A key policy decision to be made is whether to try to have
anything in an umbrella agreement concerning the national treatment
obligation. This obligation would require a nation to treat
foreign service providers at least as favorably as it treats its
domestic service providers. This obligation is probably the core
or "guts" of meaningful international discipline of national
regulation concerning service trade. For some types of trade it
also raises questions of the right of establishment or other
meaningful measures necessary for effective business operations by
foreign service-providers.56
This writer tends to think that it is politically unlikely
and probably unwise for nations to impose a national treatment
obligation on service trade generally, including unnamed or unknown
service sectors. National leaders would be understandably hesitant
to enter into such "blank check" type obligation which could cut
deeply into a wide variety of existing and 'future government
regulations, and trod on sovereign toes in a very uncomfortable
way. To include such a requirement in an umbrella agreement could
greatly inhibit the broad participation in that agreement which
could build toward meaningful future evolution of sound rules in
many service sectors. It seems wiser to leave the national
treatment obligation to particular definition and implementation in
an optional protocol and to each specific sector agreement. Each
sector will have a number of special problems and features which
can be dealt with'in negotiating the specific sector agreements.
Currently, the amount of information available for many sectors is
probably not adequate for a good understanding as to how a general
umbrella national treatment clause would impact national systems.
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There are two qualifications on these thoughts which could
be made. First, an umbrella agreement might contain some sort of
statement of a national treatment "objective", or "principle"
perhaps requiring nations to pursue (in the longer run) a general
goal of national treatment "to the fullest extent possible". This
provision could be coupled with transparency requirements, such as
a requirement to report any situation where foreign service
providers are not treated as well as domestic providers, and a
requirement to respond meaningfully to requests for information
along the same Lines. It could also include text which states
goals of providing meaningful market access, when mere national
treatment might not be enough to assure such access. In addition,
some consideration should be given to the problem of "de facto"
discrimination, in cases where measures appear on their face to be
non-discriminatory, but in fact operate to the detriment of foreign
providers.
Second, as outlined in Part IV below, it may be that a
special subgroup of the umbrella membership is prepared to go
further in accepting a national treatment obligation in an optional
protocol. If so, such a "second tier" membership could be designed
as part of the umbrella agreement, or as a separate agreement
analogous to a specific sector agreement, e.g. an "Agreement on
General National Treatment Obligations for Service Trade". Such an
agreement could be governed by the same disciplines under the
umbrella agreement as a special sector agreement, except that it
might apply to a number of service sectors rather than just one.
Indeed a negotiated set of national country "schedules" of sectors
could be envisaged as part of such "national treatment service
agreement."
In any event, the preparatory negotiators for the umbrella
agreement could make a prerequisite of the implementation of an
umbrella agreement, that at least several specific sector
agreements (with appropriate national treatment obligations) come
into effect also.
The apparently successful agreements o services in the
U.S. - Canada Free Trade Area notifications, ' might suggest that
a multilateral services umbrella can be more ambitious. It must be
remembered, however, that the U.S. and Canada have cultures,
economies and legal structure that are much more similar than those
of probably any other members of GATT. The enormous diversity
among GATT members makes it unwise~to conclude that the UJ.S.-Canada
relation will always be an effective model in a context of much
greater diversity.
I. General Exceptions
It would probably be wise to specify in the umbrella
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agreement, a series of general exceptions which would apply not
only to obligations of the umbrella agreement, but also to any
specific sector agreement unless that specific agreement provided
explicit measures to the contrary (negating the general exception.)
GATT Article XX and XXI contains a series of exceptions
5 8  which
should be considered, such as health and welfare measures, monopoly
policies and laws, intellectual property measures, and national
security. All of these, particularly national security, are
troublesome and can lead to considerable dispute. Nevertheless
they are necessary. Thus it is wise to think through language and
procedures which give national sovereigns some leeway, but imposes
some constraints (such as the modified or "soft" MFN and national
treatment commitments of GATT Article XX.) Reporting and
transparency requirements should be linked to these (and any other)
exceptions.
GATT has several particularly troublesome exceptions which
must be considered by analogy for a services agreement. One is for
free trade areas and customs unions. 5 9  Another is the GATT
Article 35 "opt out" provision, 6 0 under which any GATT contracting
party or newly entering party can announce that it will not have a
GATT treaty relationship with any other GATT party. This option in
GATT is only exercisable at one time -- the time that one of the
parties enters GATT. However, countries have in fact severed
trading relations (or imposed embargoes) with other GATT parties at
various other times in their GATT relations. 6 1  While such
measures have uncertain legal status, these severences of trading
relations have nevertheless been implemented and tolerated. It
might simply be best to make explicit provision for such actions in
the umbrella agreement, recognizing reality of international
relations and providing for a "total opt out" for national
sovereign or security reasons, if certain due notice and
transparency provisions are fulfilled.
Another GATT "exception" is the escape clause of Article
XIX. By analogy again, some thought should be given to the
question whether a general escape clause should be included in a
services umbrella agreement, applying also to specific sector
agreements (unless the specific agreement negated it.)62
Other exceptions to consider include waiver authority, and
measures for developing countries, discussed below.
J. Waiver Provisions
Since the future is so hard to foresee, it is useful (as
GATT experience demonstrates) to include a provision allowing
obligations to be waived. In GATT, a two-thirds vote is required
for a waiver, and there has been some interpretative problems about
other requirements for waivers. 6 3 A waiver provision in a services
umbrella agreement could include the following features:
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1) Applies to all umbrella and specific sector
obligations, unless a sector agreement explicitly negates a waiver
possibility for named obligation
2) Requires a special qualified vote, and for waiving a
specific sector agreement obligation, requires a special vote of
only the nations which have accepted that agreement.
3) Waivers should always be limited in time, and the
umbrella could specify that unless a shorter period is otherwise
stated, a waiver expires after five years. They would be, however,
renewable under the same procedure as originally granted.
4) Reporting, annual review, and transparency requirements
should be part of every waiver, and the umbrella agreement can
contain details about this to apply to every waiver not otherwise
making provision for these details.
K. Measures for Developing Countries
Both for general policy reasons, and as a recognition of
realistic political constraints, special provisions for developing
countries will undoubtedly be necessary. 6  The umbrella agreement
could contain at least some general "aspirational" provisions, and
perhaps some clauses similar to various articles in the Tokyo Round
GATT codes which provide special assistance to developing
countries. Details and specifics might better be placed in
specific sector agreements. The question of "graduation" or time
limitations on special favors for developing countries must be
faced.
Clearly developing countries will desire some recognition
of infant industry arguments applied to some service sectors, such
as banking, or insurance, or stock and securities brokers. In some
cases these desires will merit special consideration. Whether a
legal exception for such desires should be placed in the umbrella
agreement, however, is less clear. Disciplined supervisory
mechanisms, perhaps linked to a time limit, might be considered.
Some text on which countries would be recognized as
developing countries for these purposes, should be included
(perhaps with a list of countries.) 6 5
L. Reciprocity
Some thought should given to the question whether it makes
sense to articulate in any formal manner, some sort of notion of
"reciprocity" in the development of rules for services. 66 The
umbrella agreement might include at least some general
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considerations on this question, perhaps only as part of the
statement of objectives, or more significantly as a general clause
expressing some obligation to be motivated (or not) by ideas of
reciprocity.
M. Final Clauses
A series of typical treaty "final clauses" will be
needed, to cover questions of signature, ratification,
implementation, and the like. In all probability a prohibition on
treaty reservations (similar to the Law of the Sea treaty draft)
would be advisable.
N. Existing International Service Agreements
Consideration will be needed to the relationship to the
umbrella agreements and certain sector agreements of some existing
international agreements covering services (such as the agreements
for the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization, the International
Telecommunication Union, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization).67
For example, while understanding the formidable
political, interest group, and bureaucratic opposition possible, it
might be considered wise to bring an existing agreement or
organization into some type of formal relationship to the umbrella
agreement, comparable to a sector agreement.
IV. The Middle Layer or Optional Protocol
There are, of course, some advantages of trying to obtain
somewhat more significant obligations from a core group of
like-minded nations, to apply to a number of service sectors. Some
of these advantages are based on the difficulty of negotiating a
significant number of sector agreements and the time it will take
to do so. Likewise there may be opportunities for cross-sector
swaps (if you agree to include banking we will agree to include
insurance, etc.). Consequently there may be room for a somewhat
general set of obligations which would apply to many service
sectors. In all likelihood, these obligations should specify a
list of sectors to which they apply (to avoid the "blank-check"
worries). In can even be imagined that the list of sectors could
become negotiated "lists", similar to scheduled tariff concessions
in GATT or the entities in the GATT Government Procurement Code.
The key argument of this papers however, is that if this
objective is desirable, it should be accomplished in such a way so
as not to undermine the establishment of an appropriate broadly
subscribed legal-institutional structure which will best serve the
long range process of developing an evolutional for increasingly
significant international discipline for trade in a number of
service sectors, with a larger and larger number of countries.
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This should be a decades long process.
Thus if more significant obligations are contemplated, and such
obligations might serious inhibit the adherence of large number of
nations to the overall structure, it would seem wise to put such
added obligations, into a form which could be optionally accepted,
not as a prerequisite to membership in the overall umbrella.
(Obligations might include both some of those listed above, under
the "first layer", and others listed below, under the discussion of
the specific sector agreements.) For a "core group" of countries,
it might become a negotiating requirement that acceptance of the
optional protocol is a prerequisite to the coming into force of the
whole package of agreements (the umbrella, and several sector
agreements.)
There are several ways to do this, but one which seems
efficient is providing in the umbrella agreement an "optional
protocol", which would specify a series of significant obligations,
certainly including MFN and more impressive "regulatory due
process" and transparency requirements, but might also include a
reasonably binding national treatment obligation or principle. (I
continue to think that the specific sectors are sufficiently
diverse that details of national treatment and market access
obligations will need to be worked out for each sector.)
The basic thrust of this optional protocol would be to provide
a few obligations, including a code conditional MFN obligation, to
a specified list of sectors, but to also provide that in the event
that adherents to the optional protocol also have accepted a
specific sector agreement, as between them the rules of the
specific sector agreement would prevail over those of the umbrella
optional protocol. Thus a specific sector agreement might have an
altered or more stringent MFN and/or national treatment clause, and
these would prevail as between nations which belong to the specific
sector agreement even if such nations had accepted the optional
protocol. The MFN clause in the SSA would likely be "code
conditional", so it would be important that the MFN of the optional
protocol allow an exception for this type of SSA clause.
V. The Nature and Obligations of Specific Sector Agreements
Most of the substantive international obligations on service
trade are likely to be contained in a series of specific sector
agreements, "SSA's", which can be iegotiated over a period of
decades. If the .umbrella agreement is thoughtfully constructed it
can furnish both the institutional structure for negotiating and
effectively implementing such SSA' s, and an incentive or
facilitation for negotiating such agreements. Each SSA can then be
tailored to the complexc specific needs of a particular sector.
Some of the rules and principles regarding SSA's have been
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discussed above. For example, the SSA, to be approved as an
agreement under the umbrella so as to obtain the benefits of such
agreement including secretariat services, dispute settlement
procedures, and certain exemptions from particular general
obligations such as MFN, must conform to various umbrella agreement
requirements, including being open for acceptance to all umbrella
agreement member countries. In addition, an SSA could embrace
provisions concerning a long list of topics including: 6 8
Extent of National Treatment obligation
Effective Market Access and its meaning
Subsidies
"Dumping"
"Presence", or questions of investment (cf. right of
establishment) which is essential for effective
delivery of services
Monopoly/competition policies; actions by private
firms which damages competition
Extent to which rules apply to political
subdivisions of a federal state
Quantitative versus tariff type barriers at the




Transition periods and standstill
Special measures for intellectual property in this
sector
Safeguards
Grandfather clauses for existing legislation/practices,
with provision for phase out of these exceptions
over a period of time
Committee of signatories, voting (and whether weighted)
(although a better approach might be to use instead
the umbrella agreement supervisory body with voting
restricting to nations which have accepted the SSA.)
New rule formation/negotiation over time; amending the
agrement
Supervision of rules, and possible provision for
complaints or information to be provided from
injured private parties, as a procedure
preliminary or technical leading up to the
umbrella agreement dispute settlement procedure.
Final provisions on ratification, implementation,
amending etc. or re.liance on umbrella agreement
provisions which provide these.
Obviously each of these topics could be discussed at some
length. How obligations on "subsidies" or "dumping", for example
should be applied in specific sectors, is very complex and beyond
the expertise of this writer. Various other study projects, such
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as that of the services project of the American Enterprise
Institute, have explored some of these issues in depth.
V. Conclusions
The necessity for developing an international institutional and
rule-oriented framework for discipline on national government
measures relating to trade in services is very clear. The time is
ripe, because needs are obvious, while positions on many issues
have not yet "hardened" into government practices shored up by
powerful special interests. Delay could be very damaging as
temptations are growing for national governments to cater to
domestic service providers at the expense of opportunities for
international trade in providing service. The subject is extremely
complex, however. Consequently, an approach which stresses
establishing a legal and institutional framework which will
facilitate a pragmatic step by step evolution of specific rules for
various service sectors is best. This paper has suggested a number
of ways to do that.
